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WHEN A DATA BREACH COMES A-KNOCKIN’,
THE FTC COMES A-BLOCKIN’: EXTENDING
THE FTC’S AUTHORITY TO COVER
DATA-SECURITY BREACHES
INTRODUCTION
Somewhere in the United States, an unsuspecting consumer is one
credit card swipe away from being a victim of a data-security breach,
exposing her financial or personal information to unauthorized third
parties.1  In 2007, this scenario was a reality for millions of consumers
of the TJX Companies, Inc. (TJX), the “largest off-price department
store chain in [America],” in what was once labeled the biggest data
breach in history.2  In 2013, however, Target Corporation (Target) sur-
passed TJX’s record.3  On December 19, 2013, Target informed the
world that its United States stores experienced a massive data-security
breach, compromising the personal and financial information of some
100 million customers.4  As a result, Target sustained breach-related
costs of $148 million.5  Large data breaches affecting companies, such
as TJX and Target, trigger a pivotal question for the United States
government: who will ensure the protection of consumer data and pri-
vacy if not the companies with whom consumers willingly share their
personal and financial information?
1. Abraham Shaw, Note, Data Breach: From Notification to Prevention Using PCI DSS, 43
COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 517, 546 (2010); see also Complaint at 1, TJX Cos., No. C-4227, FTC
File No. 072-3055 (July 29, 2008) [hereinafter TJX Complaint], 2008 WL 3150421.
2. Shaw, supra note 1, at 542, 545–46 (explaining that the TJX breach resulted in 94 million
compromised credit cards because TJX scanned the credit card data from the magnetic strip of
the cards and stored such information in clear, readable text, rather than using encryption); see
also TJX Complaint, supra note 1, at 3.
3. Neiman Marcus Falls Victim to Cyber-Security Attack, Says Some Customers’ Cards Com-
promised, TOLEDO BLADE (Jan. 11, 2014), http://www.toledoblade.com/Retail/2014/01/11/Nei-
man-Marcus-falls-victim-to-cyber-security-attack-says-some-customers-cards-compromised.html.
4. Id.; see also A Message from CEO Gregg Steinhafel About Target’s Payment Card Issues,
TARGET (Dec. 20, 2013), http://www.corporate.target.com/discover/article/Important-Notice-Un-
authorized-access-to-payment-ca.; Data Breach FAQ, TARGET, http://www.corporate.target.com/
about/shopping-experience/payment-card-issue-FAQ (last visited Feb. 4, 2014); Rachel Abrams,
Target Puts Data Breach Costs at $148 Million, and Forecasts Profit Drop, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 6,
2014, at B3, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2014/08/06/business/target-puts-data-breach-
costs-at-148-million.html?_r=1.
5. Abrams, supra note 4, at B3.
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As companies like Target increase their collection of consumer per-
sonally identifiable information (consumer PII), the inherent risks as-
sociated with data security and data privacy also increase.6  Data
breaches have become a worldwide epidemic.7  Most breaches are the
result of companies employing insufficient data-security practices,
leaving consumer PII vulnerable to third-party exploitation.8  This
vulnerability in turn increases the threat to a consumer’s physical and
financial safety.9
In an effort to police the threat to consumer safety and data privacy,
the Federal Trade Commission (FTC or Commission) has become the
nation’s primary enforcement agency.10  It ensures that companies
handling consumer PII implement reasonable data-security measures
to protect such personal information.11  The Commission pushes com-
panies to self regulate by encouraging them to create custom security
programs for their individual business models.12  To assist companies
6. See Peter S. Frechette, Note, FTC v. LabMD: FTC Jurisdiction over Information Privacy Is
“Plausible,” but How Far Can It Go?, 62 AM. U. L. REV. 1401, 1401–02 (2013); VERIZON, 2012
DATA BREACH INVESTIGATIONS REPORT 2 (2012), available at http://www.verizonenterprise
.com/resources/reports/pr_data-breach-investigations-report-2012-ebk_en_xg.pdf (“A study con-
ducted by Verizon RISK Team with cooperation from the Australian Federal Police, Dutch Na-
tional High Tech Crim Unit, Irish Reporting & Information Security Service, Police Central e-
Crime Unit, and United States Secret Service.”).
7. See VERIZON, supra note 6, at 2; see also Motion to Dismiss by Defendant Wyndham Hotels
& Resorts LLC, FTC v. Wyndham Worldwide Corp., No. CV 12-1365 (D. Ariz. filed Aug. 27,
2012) [hereinafter Wyndham Motion to Dismiss], 2012 WL 3916987.
8. FTC v. LabMD, Inc., No. 1:12-cv-3005, slip op. at 14–15 (N.D. Ga. Nov. 26, 2012).
9. VERIZON, supra note 6, at 2; see also Data Security and Security Breach Notification Act of
2010: Hearing on S. 3742 Before the Subcomm. on Consumer Prot., Prod. Safety & Ins. of S.
Comm. on Commerce, Sci. & Transp., 111th Cong. 5 (2010) [hereinafter Sept. 22, 2010 FTC
Statement] (prepared statement of Maneesha Mithal, Assoc. Dir. of the Div. of Privacy & Iden-
tity Prot., FTC).
10. Daniel J. Solove & Woodrow Hartzog, The FTC and the New Common Law of Privacy,
114 COLUM. L. REV. 583, 604 (2014); see also Gerard M. Stegmaier & Wendell Bartnick, Essay,
Psychics, Russian Roulette, and Data Security: The FTC’s Hidden Data-Security Requirements, 20
GEO. MASON L. REV. 673, 674 (2013); Discussion Draft of a Bill To Require Greater Protection
for Sensitive Consumer Data and Timely Notification in Case of Breach: Hearing Before the Sub-
comm. on Commerce, Mfg. & Trade of the H. Comm. on Energy & Commerce, 112th Cong. 43
(2011) [hereinafter June 15, 2011 FTC Statement] (prepared statement of Edith Ramirez,
Comm’r, FTC).
11. Sept. 22, 2010 FTC Statement, supra note 9, at 5; see also June 15, 2011 FTC Statement,
supra note 10, at 44.
12. Balancing Privacy and Innovation: Does the President’s Proposal Tip the Scale?: Hearing
Before the Subcomm. on Commerce, Mfg. & Trade of the H. Comm. on Energy & Commerce,
112th Cong. 40 (2012) [hereinafter Mar. 29, 2012 FTC Statement] (statement of Jon Leibowitz,
Chairman, FTC), available at http://www.energycommerce.house.gov/sites/republicans.energy
commerce.house.gov/files/Hearings/CMT/20120329/HHRG-112-IF17-WState-JLeibowitz-201203
29.pdf; see also FTC, PROTECTING CONSUMER PRIVACY IN AN ERA OF RAPID CHANGE: RECOM-
MENDATIONS FOR BUSINESSES AND POLICYMAKERS, at i (2012) [hereinafter 2012 PRIVACY RE-
PORT], available at http://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/reports/federal-trade-commis
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in developing effective security programs, the Commission provides a
de facto framework that can be derived from its practical guidelines,
consent decrees, privacy reports, educational tools, and workshops.13
The Commission uses its statutory authority as the driving force be-
hind its data privacy and security agenda.14  Specifically, the Commis-
sion invokes Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act of 1914
(FTC Act)15 to monitor, investigate, and regulate a company’s “de-
ceptive” or “unfair” data-security practices.16  To date, the Commis-
sion has used its Section 5 authority to bring over forty data-security
lawsuits against companies for their failure to adequately protect con-
sumer PII.17
A review of these lawsuits reveals that each FTC filing follows a
similar process.  First, the Commission investigates whether the com-
pany’s data-collection practice violates Section 5.18  After the investi-
gation begins, the Commission may send a cease-and-desist order to
the company regarding its data practice.19  Next, the company and the
Commission typically reach a settlement agreement memorialized in a
consent decree.20  The consent decree details the steps the company
agrees to take to protect consumer data, such as completely refraining
from a particular data-collection practice,21 modifying a practice,22 or
sion-report-protecting-consumer-privacy-era-rapid-change-recommendations/120326privacyre
port.pdf.
13. 2012 PRIVACY REPORT, supra note 12, at 1, 22 (explaining that privacy by design involves
a company building privacy into the development of its products or services); see also Mar. 29,
2012 FTC Statement, supra note 12, at 43–44; June 15, 2011 FTC Statement, supra note 10, at 50.
14. Frechette, supra note 6, at 1402; see also Stegmaier & Bartnick, supra note 10, at 674.
15. Federal Trade Commission Act of 1914 § 5, 15 U.S.C. § 45 (2012).
16. Id. § 45(a)(1); see also Frechette, supra note 6, at 1402; Herbert Hovenkamp, The Federal
Trade Commission and the Sherman Act, 62 FLA. L. REV. 871, 871 (2010).
17. Edith Ramirez, Chairwoman, FTC, Keynote Address at the Technology Policy Institute
Aspen Forum: The Privacy Challenges of Big Data: A View from the Lifeguard’s Chair 2 (Aug.
19, 2013), available at http://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/public_statements/privacy-
challenges-big-data-view-lifeguard%E2%80%99s-chair/130819bigdataaspen.pdf; see also Plain-
tiff’s Response in Opposition to Wyndham Hotels & Resorts’ Motion to Dismiss at 2, FTC v.
Wyndham Worldwide Corp., No. 2:12-cv-01365-PHX-PGR (D. Ariz. filed Oct 1, 2012) [hereinaf-
ter Plaintiff’s Response], 2012 WL 4766957.
18. 15 U.S.C. § 45.
19. FTC v. Accusearch Inc., 570 F.3d 1187, 1193 (10th Cir. 2009).
20. See, e.g., Agreement Containing Consent Order, EPIC Marketplace, Inc., No. C-4389,
FTC File No. 112-3182 (Dec. 5, 2012) [hereinafter Epic Consent Decree], available at https://
www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/cases/2012/12/121205epicorder.pdf.
21. Id. at 3.
22. Consent Decree & Order for Civil Penalties, Permanent Injunction & Other Relief at 12,
United States v. Path, Inc., No. 3:13-cv-0048-RS (N.D. Cal. filed Feb. 8, 2013) [hereinafter Path
Consent Decree], available at http://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/cases/2013/02/
130201pathincdo.pdf.
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creating a better, more comprehensive security program altogether.23
Finally, if a company violates the consent decree, the FTC may sue for
civil penalties.24  If, however, the company does not reach a settle-
ment agreement, then the FTC may file a civil lawsuit against the
company in federal district court, alleging an FTC Act violation.25
Investigating companies and drafting consent decrees is the stan-
dard protocol the Commission uses in its effort to prevent harm to
consumer privacy in light of increased data breaches.26  The decrees
are made publicly available for other companies as they consider or
reflect on their own data-collection practices.27  In addition to the con-
sent decrees, the Commission provides comprehensive guidelines de-
tailing best practices to help companies develop reasonable data-
security methods at the planning stages of their products or services.28
The Commission also hosts workshops with interested stakeholders to
discuss current data-security risks and to suggest proper ways to man-
age such risks.29
In response to its efforts, however, the Commission has been met
with stark criticism about its data-security enforcement.  Many oppo-
nents argue that the Commission lacks any authority whatsoever to
regulate data security under Section 5,30 because Congress has not ex-
plicitly confirmed the extent of such authority, if any, and the Com-
mission has failed to create any formal rules to help enforce or
23. Decision & Order at 3, HTC America Inc., No. C-4406, FTC File No. 122-3049 (Feb. 22,
2013) [hereinafter HTC Consent Decree], available at http://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/docu-
ments/cases/2013/07/130702htcdo.pdf (describing that HTC Corporation agreed to develop a
comprehensive security program and develop security patches to fix the security vulnerabilities
of the pre-installation software that exposed consumer devices to malware); see also Epic Con-
sent Decree, supra note 20, at 3 (establishing that Epic Marketplace will refrain from engaging in
its “history sniffing” practice, which circumvented the consumer’s ability to prevent online
tracking).
24. 15 U.S.C. § 57(b).
25. Id. § 57(b)(1).
26. June 15, 2011 FTC Statement, supra note 10, at 44.
27. See Legal Resources, FTC BCP BUS. CENTER, http:// www.business.ftc.gov/legal-resources/
all-35 (last visited Jan. 1, 2015).
28. FTC, FINAL REPORT OF THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON
ONLINE ACCESS AND SECURITY (2000) [hereinafter 2000 PRIVACY REPORT], available at http://
www.govinfo.library.unt/acoas/papers/acoasfinal1.pdf; see also FTC, PROTECTING CONSUMER
PRIVACY IN AN ERA OF RAPID CHANGE: A PROPOSED FRAMEWORK FOR BUSINESSES AND
POLICYMAKERS—PRELIMINARY FTC STAFF REPORT (2010) [hereinafter 2010 PRIVACY RE-
PORT], available at http://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/reports/federal-trade-commis-
sion-bureau-consumer-protection-preliminary-ftc-staff-report-protecting-consumer/
101201privacyreport.pdf; 2012 PRIVACY REPORT, supra note 12, at 1.
29. June 15, 2011 FTC Statement, supra note 10, at 51; see also Mar. 29, 2012 FTC Statement,
supra note 12, at 52.
30. Stegmaier & Bartnick, supra note 10, at 691.
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legitimize its assumed authority.31  Some scholars, including law pro-
fessor Gerard M. Stegmaier and attorney Wendell Bartnick, further
argue that without federal action to limit the Commission’s Section 5
authority, the Commission will continue to exceed the scope of Sec-
tion 5 by overregulating data security, an area that does not explicitly
fall under the unfair or deceptive categories of the FTC Act.32
In light of such criticisms, this Comment argues that Congress
should amend the FTC Act to confirm the Commission’s data-security
authority under Section 5.  Specifically, Congress should broaden Sec-
tion 5 to state, “unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting
commerce[, including any business or commercial practice that results
in or has the potential to cause consumer injury,] are hereby declared
unlawful.”33  The flexible language of this amendment would provide
the FTC the authority it needs to continue to regulate consumer data
privacy using the data-security groundwork the Commission has al-
ready laid.
In anticipation of the fluid and quickly evolving technological mar-
ketplace, the Commission requires the flexibility to respond effec-
tively without the hindrance of mandatory, formal rules which may
prove obsolete over time,34 or with the increased threat of opponents
challenging the Commission’s data-security authority in federal court.
The Commission has already taken steps to create a de facto frame-
work to guide a company’s creation of effective data-security prac-
tices.35  The Commission argues that it maintains an adequate amount
of discretion in investigating and regulating the changing technologi-
cal data marketplace.36  This very marketplace is embracing more inti-
mate practices of data collection and transferability, increasing public
concern over consumer PII exploitation and data breaches.37
31. Cf. June 15, 2011 FTC Statement, supra note 10, at 53.
32. Frechette, supra note 6, at 1415; see also Michael D. Scott, The FTC, the Unfairness Doc-
trine, and Data Security Breach Litigation: Has the Commission Gone Too Far?, 60 ADMIN. L.
REV. 127, 128–30 (2008); Stegmaier & Bartnick, supra note 10, at 676.
33. 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1) (2012) (bracketed text added).
34. See Frechette, supra note 6, at 1406; see also June 15, 2011 FTC Statement, supra note 10,
at 53; Adam Thierer, The Pursuit of Privacy in a World Where Information Control Is Failing, 36
HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 409, 414 (2013).
35. See 2012 PRIVACY REPORT, supra note 12, at vii–viii (identifying best practices set by the
FTC); Shaw, supra note 1, at 607 (noting a list of common inadequate data-security practices
targeted by the FTC); supra notes 18–25 and accompanying text (detailing the process typically
utilized by the FTC to establish consent decrees).
36. June 15, 2011 FTC Statement, supra note 10, at 53.
37. See generally Nancy J. King, When Mobile Phones Are RFID-Equipped—Finding
E.U.–U.S. Solutions To Protect Consumer Privacy and Facilitate Mobile Commerce, 15 MICH.
TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 107 (2008); FTC Seeks Input on Privacy and Security Implications
of the Internet of Things, FTC (Apr. 17, 2013), http://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/
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Part II of this Comment discusses the Commission’s use of the FTC
Act in data-security cases.  Specifically, Part II uses federal cases to
demonstrate how the Commission currently regulates data-security
practices under the “deceptive” and “unfair” prongs of Section 5.38
Part III analyzes how the Commission has effectively handled data-
security cases for years using its operative de facto framework, and
explains that it should be granted Congress’s legislative support to
continue.39  Part IV discusses how the Commission’s current frame-
work will continue to positively impact the future of data privacy and
protect consumer and business interests alike in an advancing techno-
logical world.40
II. BACKGROUND
Section 5 of the FTC Act prohibits “unfair or deceptive acts or
practices in or affecting commerce.”41  The authority to determine
whether a practice is “deceptive” or “unfair” is granted to the Com-
mission.42  The Commission uses its Section 5 authority to bring data-
security enforcement actions against companies it deems to have used
deceptive or unfair practices in their collection or maintenance of con-
sumer data.43  These enforcement actions often result in a consent de-
cree between companies and the Commission as part of a
settlement.44  A standard consent decree, depending on the nature of
the security practice, requires that a company take several actions, in-
cluding the (1) development of a comprehensive security program; (2)
provision of biennial audits to the Commission regarding its compli-
2013/04/ftc-seeks-input-privacy-and-security-implications-internet-things; Internet of Things—
Privacy & Security in a Connected World, FTC (Nov. 19, 2013, 8:30 AM), http://www.ftc.gov/
news-events/events-calendar/2013/11/internet-things-privacy-security-connected-world.
38. See infra notes 41–119 and accompanying text.
39. See infra notes 121–257 and accompanying text.
40. See infra notes 258–278 and accompanying text.
41. 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1) (2012).
42. Orkin Exterminating Co. v. FTC, 849 F.2d 1354, 1363 (11th Cir. 1988).
43. Complaint at 7–8, HTC America Inc., No. C-4406, FTC File No. 122-3049 (June 25, 2013),
available at http://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/cases/2013/07/130702htccmpt.pdf; see
also Complaint at 8–9, Facebook, Inc., No. C-4365, FTC File No. 092-3184 (July 27, 2012) [here-
inafter Facebook Complaint], available at http://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/cases/
2012/08/120810facebookcmpt.pdf.  The Facebook complaint explains that the Commission took
action against Facebook, Inc. (Facebook) for its failure to adequately protect consumer privacy
after launching its new privacy settings by subjecting consumers to the risk of “unwelcome con-
tacts from persons who may have been able to infer their locale based on the locales of their
Friends . . . and the organizations reflected in their Pages.” Facebook Complaint, supra, at 8.
The Commission established that this constitutes a deceptive practice because Facebook failed to
disclose that consumers were no longer able to restrict access to their PII, including their names,
picture, Friend List, and Networks. Id. at 8–9.
44. Frechette, supra note 6, at 1403.
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ance with such program for twenty years; (3) provision of monetary
redress to consumers and disgorgement of ill-gotten gains; (4) deletion
of illegally obtained consumer information; and (5) provision of notice
to those consumers who have been affected by the deceptive or unfair
data practice.45
For example, the Commission brought an enforcement action
against Path, Inc. (Path) for deceptive practices.46  Path is a social
networking service and an electronic journal application.47  The Com-
mission investigated Path in part due to Path’s unauthorized collection
of information from its consumers’ mobile address book.48  Pursuant
to a consent decree, Path agreed to (1) develop a comprehensive pri-
vacy program, including development of physical safeguards to pro-
tect consumer PII; (2) disclose to consumers the categories of data
Path collects; (3) obtain affirmative consent from consumers prior to
collecting their data; and (4) provide the Commission an audit report
detailing compliance with its newly created security program every
two years.49  This consent decree also provides the Commission the
ongoing authority to monitor the company’s commitment to consumer
protection.50
A. Data-Security Enforcement Under the Deceptive Prong
of the FTC Act
The FTC Act separates unlawful business practices into “deceptive”
and “unfair” prongs, granting the Commission the authority to deter-
mine what conduct falls under which prong.51  Though the FTC Act
does not provide definitions for the terms “unfair” and “deceptive”52
the Commission operates under judicially created tests to determine
whether a practice is unfair53 and deceptive.
To establish a claim for deception, the Commission must show that
a company’s business practice “is likely to mislead consumers acting
45. Id.; June 15, 2011 FTC Statement, supra note 10, at 46; see also, e.g., Path Consent Decree,
supra note 22, at 12–14. See generally FTC, 2014 PRIVACY & DATA SECURITY UPDATE (2014)
[hereinafter 2014 PRIVACY UPDATE], available at http://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/re-
ports/privacy-data-security-update-2014/privacydatasecurityupdate_2014.pdf.
46. Complaint at 9, United States v. Path, Inc., No. C-13-0448 (N.D. Cal. filed Jan. 31, 2013)
[hereinafter Path Complaint], available at http://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/cases/
2013/02/130201pathinccmpt.pdf.
47. Id. at 3.
48. Id. at 4.
49. Path Consent Decree, supra note 22, at 12–14.
50. Frechette, supra note 6, at 1403.
51. 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1) (2012).
52. See id. § 44 (providing a list of definitions for Section 5 of the FTC Act).
53. See infra notes 73–75 and accompanying text for details regarding the “unfair” test.
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reasonably under the circumstances.”54  The Commission typically in-
vokes its deception authority in cases in which a company misrepre-
sents or omits material information when representing or marketing
its services or products.55  The Commission has brought claims for de-
ception against companies that have violated their own published pri-
vacy policy statements by either engaging in the unauthorized
collection of data56 or failing to uphold a promise to secure consumer
data.57
For example, in 2011, the Commission brought a claim under the
deceptive prong against Google, Inc. (Google) for violating its own
published privacy policy.58  In its policy, Google assured consumers
that once they provided their personal information to sign up for any
of its services such as Gmail, Google would request the consumer’s
consent prior to using the information in a manner different from the
purpose for which it was initially collected.59  But, after launching its
social networking service “Google Buzz,” Google automatically, and
without prior notice or consumer consent, transferred its consumers’
personal information from Gmail to Google Buzz.60
Consumers complained to Google that this automatic transfer of
their personal data, in some instances, threatened exposure to unau-
thorized third parties such as abusive partners or parties against whom
they had a restraining order.61  As a result, the Commission took ac-
tion against Google for breaking its own data-security promise.62  In
order to settle the action, Google and the Commission entered into a
consent decree.63  Under the decree, Google agreed to secure affirma-
tive consent prior to sharing consumer information and to adequately
disclose its data-collection practices in its policy statement.64
54. FTC v. Stefanchik, 559 F.3d 924, 928 (9th Cir. 2009).
55. See, e.g., First Amended Complaint for Injunctive & Other Equitable Relief at 18, FTC v.
Wyndham Worldwide Corp., No. 2:12-cv-01365-PHX-PGR (D. Ariz. filed Aug. 9, 2012) [herein-
after Wyndham Complaint].
56. See, e.g., Path Complaint, supra note 39, at 8–9; Complaint at 5–6, Google, Inc., No. C-
4336, FTC File No. 102-3136 (Oct. 13, 2011) [hereinafter Google Complaint], available at http://
www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/cases/2011/10/111024googlebuzzcmpt.pdf.
57. Wyndham Complaint, supra note 55, at 18–19.
58. Google Complaint, supra note 56, at 2, 5–6.
59. Id. at 2.
60. Id. at 4.
61. Id. at 5.
62. Francoise Gilbert, FTC v. Google: A Blueprint for Your Next Privacy Audit, J. INTERNET
L., Dec. 2012, at 1, 15.
63. Decision & Order, Google Inc., No. C-4336, FTC File No. 102-3136 (Oct. 13, 2011) [here-
inafter Google Consent Decree], available at http://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/
cases/2011/10/111024googlebuzzdo.pdf.
64. Id. at 3–4.
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The deceptive prong of the FTC Act holds companies accountable
for the affirmative promises they make to consumers regarding their
collection of consumer data.65  Because these promises are affirmative
misrepresentations, most companies do not push back against the
Commission’s enforcement of its deception authority.66  Accordingly,
companies must make every effort to ensure that they accurately re-
present their data-collection practices and policies to consumers.67
The Commission does, however, face pushback for its data-security
enforcement actions brought under the unfair prong.68  Companies
generally argue that because the FTC Act does not explicitly grant the
Commission authority over data-security matters, the Commission
cannot regulate data-security breaches.69
B. Data-Security Enforcement Under the Unfair Prong of Section 5
The Commission often invokes its unfairness authority when com-
panies fail to adequately protect the consumer PII they have col-
lected.70  Determining what is adequate is the major point of
contention between the Commission and the companies it regulates.71
The Commission’s enforcement of data security under the second
prong of Section 5 takes on a more demanding burden.72  Under the
unfair prong, the FTC Act requires the Commission to show that an
unfair business practice “causes or is likely to cause substantial injury
to consumers which is not reasonably avoidable by consumers them-
selves and is not outweighed by countervailing benefits to consumers
or to competition.”73  Such a showing requires the Commission to pass
a three-part test.74  To meet the “substantial injury” requirement of
65. Frechette, supra note 6, at 1404; see also Gilbert, supra note 62, at 15; Ramirez, supra note
17, at 2 (explaining that the Commission is dedicated to making sure companies uphold their
promises to keep data confidential).
66. Frechette, supra note 6, at 1404 (“The FTC has a relatively easy argument when it can
show that a company has made promises to consumers that it has not kept.”).
67. Gilbert, supra note 62, at 17.
68. See, e.g., infra notes 101–102, 111–114, and accompanying text.
69. Id.
70. Frechette, supra note 6, at 1405.
71. See, e.g., Wyndham Motion to Dismiss, supra note 7, at 21 (defendant company arguing
that it did not engage in unfair practices because the data breach it sustained was caused by a
third party that cost the company, not consumers, millions of dollars).
72. See Stegmaier & Bartnick, supra note 10, at 675 (contending that nothing in the FTC Act
grants the Commission authority to regulate data security); see also Frechette, supra note 6, at
1406 (arguing that the Commission’s authority under this prong is exceptionally broad); Scott,
supra note 32, at 159 (arguing that absent legislative guidelines, the Commission’s use of the
unfairness doctrine will yield “an expansive and unwarranted use of the unfairness doctrine”).
73. 15 U.S.C. § 45(n) (2012).
74. Solove & Hartzog, supra note 10, at 638.
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this test, the Commission generally must show that the practice at is-
sue has significant monetary, health, or safety risks for consumers.75
The Commission typically brings a claim for unfair practices when
companies fail to “employ reasonable security measures” that are
likely to cause substantial consumer injury, including identity theft or
fraudulent credit card transactions.76
Two classic and often-cited cases illustrating FTC action under the
unfair prong are DSW, Inc. (DSW), a seller of men’s and women’s
footwear,77 and BJ’s Wholesale Club (BJ’s), a seller of food and gen-
eral merchandise items.78  Each company collected and stored con-
sumer PII, including consumers’ names and credit card or bank
account information, on a wireless computer network.79  BJ’s and
DSW transmitted unencrypted consumer information through their
central computer networks.80  As a result, consumers’ credit and
banking information was stolen and used for fraudulent purchases.81
Under the unfair prong, the Commission took enforcement action
against both companies, claiming failure to adequately protect con-
sumer data through the use of reasonable data-security measures.82
When invoking its unfairness authority under Section 5, the ques-
tion the Commission considers is not “what was promised“ by the
company, but “what was expected” of the company.83  The Commis-
sion answers this question by establishing that the standard expecta-
tion is simply adequate data security.84  According to the Commission,
adequate security measures include creating administrative, technical,
and physical safeguards to protect consumer data.85  The depth and
detail of these measures depend on the sensitivity of the data the com-
pany collects, the size and complexity of the company’s data-collec-
tion operation, and the types of risks the company faces.86  The larger
the volume of and the more sensitive the consumer data that a com-
75. Id. at 639.
76. June 15, 2011 FTC Statement, supra note 10, at 44; see also FTC v. LabMD, Inc., No. 1:12-
cv-3005, slip op. at 13 (N.D. Ga. Nov. 26, 2012); Scott, supra note 32, at 152; Stegmaier &
Bartnick, supra note 10, at 674.
77. DSW Inc., 141 F.T.C. 117, 118 (2006).
78. BJ’s Wholesale Club, Inc., 140 F.T.C. 465, 466 (2005).
79. BJ’s Wholesale, 140 F.T.C. at 466–67; DSW Inc., 141 F.T.C. at 118–19.
80. BJ’s Wholesale, 140 F.T.C. at 467; DSW Inc., 141 F.T.C. at 118–19.
81. BJ’s Wholesale, 140 F.T.C. at 467; DSW Inc., 141 F.T.C. at 119–20.
82. BJ’s Wholesale, 140 F.T.C. at 467; DSW Inc., 141 F.T.C. at 119–20.
83. Solove & Hartzog, supra note 10, at 667.
84. Id. at 662.
85. BJ’s Wholesale, 140 F.T.C. at 472; see also DSW Inc., 141 F.T.C. at 123.
86. BJ’s Wholesale, 140 F.T.C. at 471; see also DSW Inc., 141 F.T.C. at 123; June 15, 2011 FTC
Statement, supra note 10, at 50.
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pany collects, the more detailed and sophisticated the security mea-
sures should be, as there is a higher risk for unauthorized interception
or potential consumer injury.87
C. Unfruitful Resistance to the Commission’s Unfairness Authority
in the Data-Security Context
The FTC has brought more than forty data-privacy lawsuits88 and
fifty cases alleging unfair and deceptive practices.89  Two cases are of
particular significance because they challenge the Commission’s au-
thority to regulate data security under Section 5: FTC v. LabMD,
Inc.90 and FTC v. Wyndham Worldwide Corp.91  In each case, a com-
pany was the target of data-security breaches as a result of poor data-
security practices.92  The Commission brought claims against both
companies alleging unreasonable data-security practices under the de-
ceptive and unfair prongs of Section 5.93  Though both companies ar-
gued that the Commission lacked authority to regulate data-security
breaches,94 their arguments have been met with skepticism by the
courts.95
1. LabMD’s Fight Against the FTC’s Unfairness Authority
LabMD, Inc. (LabMD) is a company that conducts consumer
clinical laboratory tests and reports the test results to the consumer’s
healthcare provider.96  The Commission discovered that LabMD pub-
licly disclosed the consumer PII of its nearly 9,300 consumers, includ-
ing names, Social Security numbers, dates of birth, and personal
health insurance information on its peer-to-peer (P2P) file-sharing
network.97  A common risk with P2P networks is that data can be
87. June 15, 2011 FTC Statement, supra note 10, at 50; see also Ramirez, supra note 17, at 6.
88. 2014 PRIVACY UPDATE, supra note 45, at 2.
89. Id. at 5.
90. No. 1:12-cv-3005, slip op. (N.D. Ga. Nov. 26, 2012).
91. 10 F. Supp. 3d 602 (D.N.J. 2014).
92. LabMD, No. 1:12-cv-3005, slip op. at 2; Wyndham, 10 F. Supp. 3d at 607.
93. LabMD, No. 1:12-cv-3005, slip op. at 1–2; Wyndham, 10 F. Supp. 3d at 607.
94. Petition to Limit or Quash the Civil Investigative Demand at 1, LabMD, Inc., No. 9357,
FTC File No. 102-3099 (Jan. 10, 2012), available at http://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/docu-
ments/petitions-quash/labmd-inc./120110labmdpetition.pdf; Wyndham Motion to Dismiss, supra
note 7, at 3.
95. LabMD, No. 1:12-cv-3005, slip op. at 8; Wyndham, 10 F. Supp. 3d at 612–15.
96. Complaint at 1, LabMD, Inc., No. 9357, FTC File No. 102-3099 (Aug. 28, 2013) [hereinaf-
ter LabMD Complaint], available at https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/cases/2013/
08/130829labmdpart3.pdf.
97. LabMD Complaint, supra note 96, at 4; see also FTC, PEER-TO-PEER FILE SHARING: A
GUIDE FOR BUSINESS 1 (2010) [hereinafter PEER-TO-PEER FILE SHARING], available at  https://
www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/plain-language/bus46-peer-peer-file-sharing-guide-busi-
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passed along to other P2P network users without downloading the file
from the original source, making it nearly impossible to permanently
erase data from the P2P network.98  In this case, consumer PII was
somehow made available to an unauthorized third party over
LabMD’s P2P network.99  To determine whether this disclosure was
the result of inadequate data-security practices in violation of the un-
fair prong of Section 5, and because such disclosure threatens substan-
tial consumer injury, the Commission requested that LabMD turn
over the files it held on its network.100
LabMD objected to the Commission’s request, arguing that the
Commission’s use of the unfairness doctrine was improper because it
does not have authority to regulate data security under Section 5.101
The company further argued that the unfairness doctrine was improp-
erly applied because the breach did not yield any substantial con-
sumer injury.102  The District Court for the Northern District of
Georgia rejected both arguments, ruling that Section 5 “broadly con-
fers authority on the FTC to investigate and regulate unfair prac-
tices.”103  Also, the court found that the mere threat of substantial
consumer injury is sufficient to meet the consumer injury standard,
allowing the Commission to investigate data-security matters, because
issues such as identify theft are very common.104  Through its rejection
of LabMD’s arguments and its statement that the Commission has
broad Section 5 authority,105 the court essentially confirmed the Com-
mission’s authority under Section 5 to regulate data security and con-
sumer protection.
2. Wyndham’s Fight Against the FTC’s Unfairness Authority
In 2012, a legal challenge against the Commission came from Wynd-
ham Worldwide Corp. (Wyndham), a hotel franchise, after it was hit
with both deception and unfairness violations.106  The Commission in-
itiated an investigation of Wyndham for the company’s failed privacy
policy statement after it sustained three brute force attacks to its data-
ness.pdf (explaining that peer-to-peer file sharing is the transfer of data between two computers
on a single online network).
98. LabMD Complaint, supra note 96, at 4.
99. Id.
100. LabMD, No. 1:12-cv-3005, slip op. at 2–4.
101. Id. at 11.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 8.
104. Id. at 12–13.
105. Id. at 8, 12–13.
106. FTC v. Wyndham Worldwide Corp., 10 F. Supp. 3d 602, 607 (D.N.J. 2014).
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security system within the span of eighteen months.107  The Commis-
sion determined that these unsophisticated attacks were the result of
Wyndham’s security failures, which compromised over 600,000 pay-
ment card account numbers and over $10.6 million in fraudulent trans-
actions.108  The Commission argued that Wyndham was guilty of
unfair business practices because it failed to employ simple security
features such as firewalls, encrypted text for consumer PII, and com-
plex passwords to make it difficult for hackers to access its security
system.109  Wyndham refused to enter into a consent decree, prompt-
ing the Commission to pursue legal action pursuant to Section 5 of the
FTC Act in federal district court.110
Wyndham pushed back against the Commission, filing a motion to
dismiss the Commission’s legal action.111   Wyndham asserted two ma-
jor arguments.  First, the Commission does not have data-security au-
thority, especially because the company was a victim of third-party
breaches.112  Second, even if the Commission has such authority, the
Commission must establish formal rules to enforce its authority.113
Wyndham argued that Section 5 authority is routinely invoked to pre-
vent companies from using “dishonest or unscrupulous business prac-
tices” that fall under the deceptive prong of Section 5 rather than the
unfair prong.114
The district court heard the dispute, denying Wyndham’s motion to
dismiss and assuring both parties that the scope of the Commission’s
unfairness authority covers data breaches.115  Specifically, the court’s
ruling in Wyndham is in harmony with the rulings of several other
federal courts regarding the Commission’s data-security authority.116
107. Wyndham Complaint, supra note 55, at 13 (explaining that a brute force attack is an
unsophisticated attempt by a hacker to compromise a security system by repeatedly guessing the
administrator’s username and password, which leads to a system lockout because the hacker
guessed incorrectly too many times).
108. Id. at 18.
109. Id. at 10–11.
110. Wyndham, 10 F. Supp. 3d at 616.
111. Id. at 607.
112. Id.; see also Motion to Dismiss by Defendant Wyndham Hotels & Resorts LLC at 21,
Wyndham, 10 F. Supp. 3d 602 (No. 2:13-cv-01887-ES-SCM), 2013 WL 3475984 (stating that
Wyndham, “unlike the consumers in this case, lost millions of dollars and suffered significant
reputational harm when cybercriminals attacked its network”).
113. Wyndham, 10 F. Supp. 3d at 607.
114. Wyndham Motion to Dismiss, supra note 7, at 2.
115. Wyndham, 10 F. Supp. 3d at 612.
116. See, e.g., FTC v. Accusearch Inc., 570 F.3d 1187, 1195 (10th Cir. 2009) (stating that “the
FTC may proceed against unfair practices even if those practices violate some other statute that
the FTC lacks authority to administer”); FTC v. Ken Roberts Co., 276 F.3d 583, 586, 593 (D.C.
Cir. 2001) (establishing the same); FTC v. LabMD, Inc., No. 1:12-cv-3005, slip op. at 8–9 (N.D.
Ga. Nov. 26, 2012).
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Several federal courts have established that, although not unlim-
ited,117 the Commission’s authority is tailored broadly to confront
“unprecedented situations.”118  Accordingly, the result of the district
court’s decision in Wyndham informs the remainder of the data-pri-
vacy world that the Commission’s authority with respect to data-se-
curity matters is likely within the purview of the FTC Act.119
Notwithstanding the court’s decision in Wyndham, Congress has the
power to, and should, confirm the scope of the Commission’s data-
security authority under Section 5 of the FTC Act so that there is no
question regarding the Commission’s authority.
III. ANALYSIS
Congress should explicitly confirm the Commission’s data-security
authority and endorse the Commission’s existing de facto framework.
The best strategy Congress can employ is to amend the FTC Act to
read “unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce[,
including any business or commercial practice that results in or has the
potential to cause consumer injury,] are hereby declared unlawful.”120
This amendment to the FTC Act would grant the Commission ex-
plicit data-security authority and help the Commission maintain the
liberty to adapt its enforcement practices appropriately in response to
the evolving technological advances and data-collection methods em-
ployed by companies.  The Commission’s de facto framework is essen-
tially “the closest thing the United States has to omnibus privacy
regulation.”121  The Commission has been the only federal agency to
regulate the data-security domain—a domain that would otherwise
lack enforcement action, guidance, and protection.122  Congress must
acknowledge the effectiveness of the Commission’s work and operate
hand-in-hand with the agency to set a uniform national data-security
standard.
An amendment to the FTC Act will help effectuate several goals
the Commission has expressed concerning data security.  First, the
Commission’s primary goal is to require companies to implement rea-
sonable data-security practices due to the prevalence of data
117. LabMD, No. 1:12-cv-3005, slip op. at 10.
118. Orkin Exterminating Co. v. FTC, 849 F.2d 1354, 1368 (11th Cir. 1988) (quoting FTC v.
Colgate-Palmolive, Co., 380 U.S. 374, 385 (1965)).
119. See Frechette, supra note 6, at 1414–15.
120. 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1) (2012) (bracketed text added).
121. Solove & Hartzog, supra note 10, at 676.
122. Id.
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breaches.123  Companies can, and should, expect the Commission to
respond to insufficient data-security practices, especially given their
“widespread impact and threat to consumers . . . that results from
breaches of data security and consumer privacy.”124  Second, the
Commission aims to work with companies to improve their technolog-
ical innovations.125  To effectuate this goal, the Commission encour-
ages companies to regulate themselves by creating their own
reasonable data-security models to match their individual needs, size,
and complexity.126  The Commission has provided several sources of
guidance for companies to use in developing their security models,
including privacy lawsuits,127 consent decrees,128 prepared state-
ments,129 consumer and business educational materials,130 privacy re-
ports, and workshops, town-hall meetings, and roundtables.131
The next Part of this Comment discusses (1) the existence and con-
tours of the Commission’s informal data-security authority; (2) the de-
tails of the Commission’s de facto framework for data security; (3) the
rising concerns with a constantly evolving technological marketplace;
and (4) why the Commission’s framework is ideal for the protection of
consumer PII and technological innovations.
A. The Commission Has Informal Data-Security Authority
The development of the Commission’s informal data-security au-
thority begins with the 1972 Supreme Court ruling in FTC v. Sperry &
Hutchinson Co.132  In Sperry, the Court ruled against the Commission
for its failure to show how Sperry & Hutchinson’s conduct actually
violated Section 5.133  However, the Court made it clear that the con-
struction of Section 5 authority should not be limited to govern only
123. Mar. 29, 2012 FTC Statement, supra note 12, at 1–3; see also June 15, 2011 FTC State-
ment, supra note 10, at 44; Sept. 22, 2010 FTC Statement, supra note 9, at 5.
124. FTC v. LabMD, Inc., No. 1:12-cv-3005, slip op. at 13 (N.D. Ga. Nov. 26, 2012).
125. See Mar. 29, 2012 FTC Statement, supra note 12, at 40–42.
126. See June 15, 2011 FTC Statement, supra note 10, at 50; see also Ramirez, supra note 17, at
4 (contending that “the FTC’s role isn’t [sic] to stand in the way of innovation; it is to ensure that
these advances are accompanied by sufficiently rigorous privacy safeguards”).
127. See 2014 PRIVACY UPDATE, supra note 45, at 2.
128. See, e.g., supra notes 20, 22–23, and accompanying text.
129. See supra notes 9–10, 12, 28, and accompanying text.
130. See, e.g., 2014 PRIVACY UPDATE, supra note 45, at 14.
131. See 2014 PRIVACY UPDATE, supra note 45, at 13.
132. 405 U.S. 233 (1972).
133. Id. at 234 (refusing to uphold the Commission’s cease-and-desist order against Sperry &
Hutchinson Co., a trading stamp company that allegedly violated Section 5 by unfairly regulating
trading stamp exchanges, among other things).
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unfair practices as it affects competing companies, but is read to also
govern unfair practices as it affects consumers.134
Since the Sperry decision, the Commission has used its Section 5
authority to expand its reach to consumer data-security issues.135  As
the Wyndham case demonstrates, however, the scope of the Commis-
sion’s self-imposed data-security authority is hotly debated.136
Although the language of Section 5 does not explicitly mention
data-security or data-privacy matters, after over forty years of policing
consumer privacy,137 courts simply assume, and appropriately so, that
such authority exists.138  Since the Commission was established in
1914, Congress has not imposed strict limits on the Commission’s au-
thority because it “gave very broad powers to the FTC to protect con-
sumers from deceptive and unfair trade practices.”139  Courts reason
that a broad interpretation of the scope of the Commission’s power is
appropriate because creating a statute that enumerates all deceptive
or unfair practices as they relate to Section 5 is an impractical task.
This is especially true given evolving business practices and the need
for relevant changes in the law to correspond to these practices.140
Surely, after the Commission’s inception, Congress anticipated a
changing business climate and foresaw the need to have an equally
evolving and responsive enforcement agency to address unforeseeable
matters.141
Legal scholars, however, propose several arguments against the
Commission’s supposed data-security authority.  First, several argue
that the Commission may be inconsistent in its data-security-related
advice to businesses because their data-security practices vary in
type.142  However, the Commission has been undeniably consistent in
requiring companies to establish reasonable data-security practices to
134. Id. at 244 (reasoning that the FTC’s authority reaches beyond antitrust matters and can
be used to enforce actions or practices that are unfair to consumers).
135. 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1) (2012).
136. See, e.g., Wyndham Motion to Dismiss, supra note 7; Scott, supra note 32, at 134–35;
Kelsey Finch, FTC v. Wyndham: Round One, PRIVACY ADVISOR (Nov. 18, 2013), http://www.pri
vacyassociation.org/publications/ftc_v._wyndham_round_one.
137. Mar. 29, 2012 FTC Statement, supra note 12, at 42; see also 2012 PRIVACY REPORT, supra
note 12, at 1.
138. See, e.g., FTC v. Accusearch Inc., 570 F.3d 1187 (10th Cir. 2009); Orkin Exterminating
Co. v. FTC, 849 F.2d 1354 (8th Cir. 1988); FTC v. LabMD, Inc., No. 1:12-cv-3005, slip op. at 9–10
(N.D. Ga. Nov. 26, 2012).
139. Stegmaeir & Bartnik, supra note 10, at 687; see also LabMD, No. 1:12-cv-3005, slip op. at
8; Orkin Exterminating, 849 F.2d at 1368.
140. William E. Kovacic & Marc Winerman, Competition Policy and the Application of Sec-
tion 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act, 76 ANTITRUST L.J. 929, 930–31 (2010).
141. See Frechette, supra note 6, at 1413.
142. E.g., Stegmaier & Bartnick, supra note 10, at 686.
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offset consumer-privacy harm.143  The LabMD court addressed this
point quite clearly: “[P]oor data-security and consumer-privacy prac-
tices facilitate and contribute to predictable and substantial harm to
consumers in violation of Section 5 because it is disturbingly common-
place for people to wrongfully exploit poor data-security and con-
sumer-privacy practices to wrongfully acquire and exploit personal
consumer information.”144  Unfair or deceptive practices that lead to
consumer harm fall directly under the jurisdiction of the FTC Act.145
Second, critics argue that the Commission lacks data-security au-
thority simply because the FTC Act does not include explicit language
concerning data-privacy security.146  This argument has clearly been
met with skepticism by federal courts as recently as the Wyndham
case.147 Similarly, critics argue that the Commission’s use of its unfair-
ness authority to regulate data breaches is misplaced because hacking
is often the result of third party intrusions whereby the company is
merely a victim, lacking any intent to spark consumer injury.148  The
Commission’s focus, however, is specifically on consumer injury, not
“the mental state of the [company] accused of a [S]ection 5 violation”;
therefore, a “party’s intent has no bearing on the question of whether
a [S]ection 5 violation has occurred.”149
Finally, critics argue that in order to adequately inform companies
on how best to avoid data-security enforcement actions, the Commis-
sion must provide formal rules and adjudications.150  However, the
FTC Act explicitly provides that the Commission “may prescribe . . .
rules which define with specificity acts or practices which are unfair or
deceptive,” establishing that rule making is discretionary.151  In fact,
exercising this optional rule-making authority is such a burdensome
143. Epic Consent Decree, supra note 20, at 3; Path Consent Decree, supra note 22, at 12;
HTC Consent Decree, supra note 22, at 3; Google Consent Decree, supra note 63, at 3.
144. FTC v. LabMD, Inc., No. 1:12-cv-3005, slip op. at 14 (N.D. Ga. Nov. 26, 2012); see also
United States v. Mead Corp, 533 U.S. 218, 228 (2001) (establishing that courts grant deference to
an agency after looking to the agency’s consistency and the persuasiveness of the agency’s
position).
145. See 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(4)(i) (2012) (“‘[U]nfair or deceptive acts or practices’ includes such
acts . . . that cause or are likely to cause reasonably foreseeable injury.”).
146. David J. Bender, Essay, Tipping the Scales: Judicial Encouragement of a Legislative An-
swer to FTC Authority over Corporate Data-Security Practices, 81 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1665,
1677 (2013).
147. FTC v. Wyndham Worldwide Corp., 10 F. Supp. 3d 602, 613 (D.N.J. 2014) (holding that
“the FTC’s unfairness authority over data security can coexist with the existing data-security
regulatory scheme”).
148. Stegmaier & Bartnick, supra note 10, at 719–20.
149. Orkin Exterminating Co. v. FTC, 849 F.2d 1354 (8th Cir. 1988).
150. Stegmaier & Bartnick, supra note 10, at 693.
151. 15 U.S.C. § 57a(a)(1)(B) (2012) (emphasis added).
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and time-consuming procedure that it would effectively render the
Commission’s authority useless because the Commission would have
been too slow to respond to pressing issues at hand, such as frequent
data breaches.152  To illustrate the burden of the rule-making process,
the Commission must (1) publish “a notice . . . [stating] with particu-
larity the text of the [proposed] rule, including any alternatives”;153 (2)
allow the opportunity for “interested persons to submit their written
data, views, and arguments”;154 and (3) provide for an informal hear-
ing where those interested persons can cross-examine each other.155
The amount of time this process would require of the FTC is so oner-
ous and ineffective “it is not surprising that the Commission has thus
far not published any rules or regulations defining specific data-secur-
ity policies.”156
Aside from their procedural burden, formal rules are not always the
most appropriate method by which federal agencies should regulate
demanding and evolving issues.157  In dynamic cases, problems must
be remedied immediately, regardless of formal rules, and the federal
agency must maintain the authority to deal with those issues “on a
case-to-case basis if the administrative process is to be effective.”158
The data-collection arena is described as one of rapid technological
change,159 and the Commission cannot possibly anticipate all data-se-
curity issues in order to make applicable formal rules.  As the Su-
preme Court stated, “Not every principle essential to the effective
administration of a statute can or should be cast immediately into the
mold of a general rule.”160
As discussed above,161 the authority to determine or construe what
is deceptive or unfair under the FTC Act is granted to the Commis-
sion.162  Accordingly, the FTC has broadened the scope of the decep-
tive and unfairness doctrines to include data-security matters plaguing
today’s society.163  The Supreme Court, on more than one occasion,
152. Bender, supra note 146, at 1671; see also June 15, 2011 FTC Statement, supra note 10, at
53 (explaining that if the Commission is to develop rules, Congress must assist to help the Com-
mission “promulgate these rules in a more timely and efficient manner”).
153. 15 U.S.C. § 57a(b)(1).
154. Id.
155. Id. § 57a(c); see also Bender, supra note 146, at 1671.
156. Bender, supra note 146, at 1671.
157. SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194, 202 (1947).
158. Id. at 203.
159. Thierer, supra note 34, at 414.
160. Chenery, 332 U.S. at 202.
161. See supra note 42 and accompanying text.
162. 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1) (2012).
163. June 15, 2011 FTC Statement, supra note 10, at 43.
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has established that courts must defer to an agency’s construction of
the statute under which it operates, especially if Congress has failed to
act or speak out regarding the specific legal issue.164  Congress has yet
to clearly act or speak regarding the Commission’s inclusion of data-
security matters under its Section 5 authority.165  This silence is signifi-
cant because data-security matters were not anticipated at the time
Section 5 was enacted.166  When Section 5 was drafted, the FTC Act
was used exclusively to regulate unfair competition practices among
companies,167 but was expanded in 1972 by the Supreme Court to pro-
tect consumers from unfair trade practices.168  Since 1999, the Com-
mission has used its Section 5 authority to protect consumer PII
collected and managed by companies, and to enforce against issues of
inappropriate security practices.169  The Commission’s expansion of its
Section 5 authority in these ways illustrates a flexible and evolving
federal agency that adapts to the changing technological marketplace.
Furthermore, contrary to the argument about the Commission’s
possible inconsistency,170 the Supreme Court has declared that an
agency is not forced to commit to one particular interpretation of a
statute.171  The Commission notes that “its understanding of the un-
fairness doctrine is the result of an ‘evolutionary process’ that refines
the standard over time through cases, rules, and . . . statements.”172
More importantly, even if the Commission has used different defini-
tions for the term “unfair,” doing so merely “adds force to the argu-
ment that the definition itself is flexible, particularly since Congress
has never indicated any disapproval of a flexible reading of the stat-
ute.”173  And, if Congress has a change of heart concerning the Com-
mission’s authority, it “has not at any time withdrawn the broad
discretionary authority originally granted the Commission.”174
Consumer privacy is of such critical importance that limiting the
Commission’s authority to monitor data security would likely harm
164. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842–45 (1984); see
also United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 229 (2001).
165. Bender, supra note 146, at 1667.
166. Id. at 1681.
167. Kovacic & Winerman, supra note 140, at 930.
168. Bender, supra note 146, at 1668 (citing FTC v. Sperry & Hutchinson Co., 405 U.S. 233
(1972)); see also Kovacic & Winerman, supra note 140, at 937.
169. Shaw, supra note 1, at 538–39.
170. See supra note 142 and accompanying text.
171. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 863 (1984) (reason-
ing that “[a]n initial agency interpretation is not instantly carved in stone”).
172. Solove & Hartzog, supra note 10, at 638–39.
173. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 864.
174. Am. Fin. Servs. Ass’n v. FTC, 767 F.2d 957, 967 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
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the American consumer.  Simply put, if companies fail to implement
reasonable data-security measures, as in the Wyndham and LabMD
cases, consumers risk substantial harm, including fraud and threats to
their physical safety.175  The Commission serves as the strong arm of
corporate accountability to ensure that companies reasonably protect
consumer data, and its operative framework and evolving Section 5
authority provide both a detailed guideline for companies to use in
developing their own data-security systems and a workable solution to
calm consumer concerns.
B. The Commission Encourages a Flexible
Self-Regulatory Framework
Part of the Commission’s de facto framework serves to aid compa-
nies’ attempt to self regulate their data-security practices.  The frame-
work includes notice and best practices.
1. The Commission Provides Notice and Guidance Regarding Its
Deception and Unfairness Enforcement Methods
Companies, including Wyndham, and some legal scholars, argue
that the Commission gives insufficient notice regarding its expecta-
tions in enforcing unfair practices.176  Specifically, they argue that
companies are not privy to the ways they can avoid a Section 5 en-
forcement action because the Commission has failed to issue formal
rules or regulations before filing an unfairness claim.177
First, the FTC has the option of regulation by rule-making or by
individual adjudication.178  As established above,179 the FTC does not
“need to formally publish rules and regulations [because] the proscrip-
tions in Section 5 are necessarily flexible.”180  Second, the Commission
has provided a thorough bundle of information concerning data-secur-
ity practices, including consent decrees, educational tools, workshops,
175. See FTC v. LabMD, Inc., No. 1:12-cv-3005, slip op. at 12–13 (N.D. Ga. Nov. 26, 2012);
FTC v. Wyndham Worldwide Corp., 10 F. Supp. 3d 602, 607 (D.N.J. 2014); see also June 15, 2011
FTC Statement, supra note 10, at 43.
176. Wyndham Motion to Dismiss, supra note 7, at 11; Stegmaier & Bartnick, supra note 10,
at 676.
177. Stegmaier & Bartnick, supra note 10, at 676, 691–92; see also Finch, supra note 136;
Wyndham Motion to Dismiss, supra note 7, at 11.
178. 15 U.S.C. § 57a(a) (2012); see also PBW Stock Exch., Inc. v. SEC, 485 F.2d 718, 732 (3d
Cir. 1973) (“The courts have consistently held that where an agency, as in this case, is given an
option to proceed by rulemaking or by individual adjudication the choice is one that lies in the
informed discretion of the administrative agency.”).
179. See supra notes 150–151.
180. FTC v. Wyndham Worldwide Corp., 10 F. Supp. 3d 602, 619 (D.N.J. 2014).
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and comprehensive guidelines on best practices.181  Through its con-
sent decrees, the Commission has given companies a blueprint which
outlines its target areas in regard to enforcement of data-security and
consumer-privacy issues.182  Companies that engage in targeted be-
havior or activities that were once investigated by the Commission can
likewise expect investigation from the Commission.183  Specifically,
the Commission has investigated companies for the following issues in
terms of deficient data-security practices:
(1) inadequately assessing system vulnerability to commonly known
or reasonably foreseeable attacks; (2) failing to apply low-cost, sim-
ple, and readily available defenses; (3) using default user ID or pass-
words to protect sensitive data rather than stronger passwords to
prevent hackers; (4) storing information in unencrypted files and
sending sensitive data via unencrypted transmission routes; and (5)
failing to develop unauthorized access detection mechanisms.184
The Commission’s investigation of these particular practices is not
surprising, because the Commission has made it explicitly clear that,
at the very least, companies possessing consumer data should employ
reasonable security measures to protect that consumer data.185  As
Professors Solove and Hartzog establish, employing adequate or rea-
sonable security measures is the Commission’s baseline standard,
which has reverberated throughout the data world.186  Surely, one can
argue that companies that suffer a data breach are merely victims of
criminal activity,187 but many of these data-security issues are com-
mon threats that could be avoided simply by use of stronger adminis-
trative passwords or mechanisms that suspend logins after too many
failed attempts.188
Some legal scholars, including Peter S. Frechette, contend that the
Commission is drifting away from its self-regulatory approach by in-
creased use of Section 5 enforcement actions and consent decrees,189
but this could not be further from the truth.  The Commission’s en-
181. June 15, 2011 FTC Statement, supra note 10, at 43.
182. Gilbert, supra note 62, at 15–16; see also Shaw, supra note 1, at 542.
183. Solove & Hartzog, supra note 10, at 607.
184. Shaw, supra note 1, at 542.
185. See, e.g., June 15, 2011 FTC Statement, supra note 10, at 44.
186. Solove & Hartzog, supra note 10, at 661.
187. Stegmaier & Bartnick, supra note 10, at 673.
188. See Sept. 22, 2010 FTC Statement, supra note 9, at 6 (explaining that the FTC brought an
action against Twitter for its mere failure to require stronger passwords and its failure to suspend
passwords after a number of login attempts, which enabled a hacker to gain control of the com-
pany’s system by using a password-guessing tool).
189. Peter S. Frechette posits that the Commission is moving away from its self-regulatory
framework because the agency “has become increasingly forceful in its use of [S]ection 5 to
enforce information privacy and security.”  Frechette, supra note 6, at 1410–11
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forcement process is more of an active compromise between the com-
pany and the agency.190  The process begins with the Commission
investigating the deceptive or unfair practice, a complaint to the com-
pany that provides for an opportunity to settle, and, if the company
settles, the court issues a consent decree.191  The consent decree is not
an isolated judicial decision, but a “mutually agreed upon [settlement
between] the FTC and the [company.]”192  The consent decree is cus-
tomized to fit the company’s size and structure, similarly to how the
company should have attempted to set its own security practices to fit
its structure.193  According to Solove and Hartzog, the decrees func-
tion much like a type of “privacy common law,” which companies and
their legal counsel can and should reference to gain an understanding
of the pattern and predictability with which the Commission operates
to enforce data security.194  This is a direct response to the critical
suggestion that the Commission might operate without any particular
consistency in regulating data-security matters or without granting
companies adequate enforcement notice.195
2. The Commission’s Best Practices Guidelines Inform Companies
on How To Implement Reasonable Security Measures
The Commission’s involvement in regulating data security would
certainly prove counterproductive if the agency failed to provide com-
panies with guidelines on how to develop reasonable data-security
practices, especially when increased business costs are at stake.196  Ac-
cordingly, the Commission has developed a form of “soft law.”197  The
Commission uses in-depth yet flexible privacy guidelines to assist
companies in implementing reasonable data-security practices using
three core technological principles: (1) privacy by design; (2) simpli-
fied consumer choice; and (3) greater transparency.198  This frame-
work, “while not controlling [on] the courts by reason of their
190. Solove & Hartzog, supra note 10, at 608–10 (labeling such process as “The Anatomy of
an FTC Action”).
191. Id. at 609–10.
192. Id. at 624.
193. Id. at 624–25.
194. Id. at 589–90, 608.
195. See Stegmaier & Bartnick, supra note 10, at 686.
196. See id. at 691 (explaining that the “penalties are serious and fair notice on how to avoid
them seems warranted”).
197. Solove & Hartzog, supra note 10, at 625.
198. 2012 PRIVACY REPORT, supra note 12, at vii–viii; see also Thierer, supra note 34, at 448
(discussing the FTC’s “privacy by design efforts”).
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authority, do[es] constitute a body of experience and informed
judgment.”199
First, privacy by design requires companies to build consumer-pri-
vacy mechanisms into their products and services as they are being
developed.200  Companies should ask themselves, “Are [our] security
measures appropriate given the volume and sensitivity of the data [we
collect]?”201  The security measures should include “physical, techni-
cal, and administrative safeguards.”202  Recall that these safeguards
are included in the standard consent decrees issued by the Commis-
sion.203  Additionally, companies should only collect consumer data
that is necessary to accomplish their specific goals, and they should
properly dispose of the data when it is no longer necessary.204
Second, simplified consumer choice requires that companies em-
power consumers with the tools necessary to “control whether their
data is collected and how it is used,” termed “choice mechanisms.”205
The choice mechanisms should be easy to use.206  One common choice
mechanism is the “do not track” feature, which allows consumers to
opt out of having their data collected while online through the click of
a button.207  Google implemented a do not track mechanism for its
search engine.208  Use of these tools help promote a company’s self-
regulation.209
Third, transparency requires that companies make a better effort to
inform consumers of their methods of collecting, using, and sharing
consumer data.210  Companies should provide this information in a
“prominent, relevant, and easily accessible place at a time and in a
context when it matters to [the consumer.]”211  For example, mobile-
service providers can develop standard graphic icons or other efficient
199. FTC v. Wyndham Worldwide Corp., 10 F. Supp. 3d 602, 621 (D.N.J. 2014) (quoting Gen.
Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 141–42 (1976)).
200. 2012 PRIVACY REPORT, supra note 12, at vii.
201. Ramirez, supra note 17, at 9.
202. June 15, 2011 FTC Statement, supra note 10, at 50.
203. See supra note 45 and accompanying text.
204. 2012 PRIVACY REPORT, supra note 12, at 26–28.
205. Id. at 35.
206. Ramirez, supra note 17, at 9.
207. 2012 PRIVACY REPORT, supra note 12, at 53.
208. Alex Howard, FTC Calls on Congress To Enact Baseline Privacy Legislation and More
Transparency of Data Brokers, RADAR (Mar. 27, 2012), http://radar.oreilly.com/2012/03/ftc-calls-
on-congress-to-enact.html.
209. See 2012 PRIVACY REPORT, supra note 12, at iii (stating that the Commission promotes
self-regulation by calling for “improved privacy disclosures and choices,” and internet organiza-
tions have responded by “developing a universal web protocol for Do Not Track”).
210. Id. at 60.
211. Id.
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ways to present quick, understandable policies to consumers regarding
how the company will use their personal information.212  Failure to
comply with this principle is often the cause behind the enforcement
actions brought by the Commission under the deceptive prong for un-
authorized data-collection practices.213  The overall goal is to make
each company’s privacy policy and data-collection method easy for
consumers to access and to understand.214
These three principles allow companies to “implement the privacy
protections . . . in a way that is proportional to the nature, sensitivity,
and amount of data collected as well as the size of the business.”215
The focus on specialized security measures is key to helping each com-
pany develop its own reasonable security measures appropriate for its
business type.216  Implementing these guidelines to help companies
engage in a self-regulatory method increases companies’ willingness to
innovate and compete for and increase benefits to consumers through
the use of improved products and services.217
Significantly, the Obama Administration acknowledges that it is es-
sential to build on the FTC’s expertise.218  The Administration also
pushed for companies to develop adequate security standards to pro-
tect consumer data, provide understandable notice to consumers
about their data-collection practices, and grant consumers control
over what personal data is collected from them.219  The Commission’s
framework has not only incentivized companies to improve their data-
security practices, but it has also been flexible enough to encourage
212. Id. at 64; see also Michael Fertik, Comments of Reputation.com, Inc. (Jan. 28, 2011),
responding to Notice of Inquiry: Information Privacy and Innovation in the Internet Economy,
65 Fed. Reg. 21226 (Apr. 23, 2010), available at http://www.ntia.doc.gov/files/ntia/comments/
101214614-0614-01/attachments/Comments%20of%20Reputation.com%20Inc%20to%20the%
20Department%20of%20Commerce-20110128.pdf.
213. See supra notes 47–49 and accompanying text.
214. Fertik, supra note 212, at 7.
215. Id. at 9.
216. See Dana Rosenfield & Donnelly McDowell, Moving Target: Protecting Against Data
Breaches Now and Down the Road, ANTITRUST, Summer 2014, at 90, 93 (“There is no single
‘correct’ data-security plan as companies should adapt their policies and practices to the practical
realities presented by their business model as well as the unique legal obligations affecting their
industry and the type of customer information they collect and store.”).
217. See 2012 PRIVACY REPORT, supra note 12, at 9 (“The privacy framework is designed to
be flexible to permit and encourage innovation.”).
218. See WHITE HOUSE, CONSUMER DATA PRIVACY IN A NETWORKED WORLD: A FRAME-
WORK FOR PROTECTING PRIVACY AND PROMOTING INNOVATION IN THE GLOBAL DIGITAL
ECONOMY 29 (2012) [hereinafter WHITE HOUSE REPORT], available at https://www.whitehouse
.gov/sites/default/files/privacy-final.pdf.
219. Id. at 11, 14, 19.
2015] FTC AUTHORITY AND DATA-SECURITY BREACHES 935
companies to build and adapt privacy protections into their own prod-
ucts and services.220
However, as the Commission has recently noted, given this flexibil-
ity, companies have been slow to adopt adequate privacy protec-
tion.221  Accordingly, the Commission has employed other practical
avenues of assistance, including consumer education materials such as
OnGuard Online,222 a program that informs consumers about the
risks of P2P file sharing and online threats such as spyware.223  Arti-
cles providing tips on how to protect consumer PII while using fea-
tures such as P2P file sharing are also available for businesses.224
Finally, the Commission has offered a seat at the table for all stake-
holders, including businesses and consumers, to address data-privacy
concerns through a series of workshops and roundtables.225  Business
representatives have acknowledged the importance of consumer trust
in growing their companies.226  Roundtables are essential to the area
of privacy law because they improve the quality of advice on the sub-
stance and the process of developing an effective and evolving data-
security framework.227  All of the Commission’s strategies taken to-
gether, including its consent decrees, best practices, online tools,
roundtables, and workshops, serve to “illuminate the FTC’s philoso-
phy and approach, as well as its interpretation of [its] Section 5
[authority].”228
C. Technological Advancements and Increased Data Breaches
Cause Consumer Privacy Concerns
America long ago bid farewell to the days when personal informa-
tion traveled no further than an individual’s geographic location.229
As a result, data security is of increasing importance to consumers,230
because information now travels the globe.  “People want to know
220. 2012 PRIVACY REPORT, supra note 12, at 9.
221. 2010 PRIVACY REPORT, supra note 28, at 8.
222. ONGUARDONLINE, http://www.onguardonline.gov (last visited Jan. 1, 2015).
223. Mar. 29, 2012 FTC Statement, supra note 12, at 57.
224. E.g., PEER-TO-PEER FILE SHARING, supra note 97.
225. See Exploring Privacy: A Roundtable Series, FTC, http://www.ftc.gov/news-events/events-
calendar/2010/03/exploring-privacy-roundtable-series (last visited Nov. 14, 2013).
226. 2012 PRIVACY REPORT, supra note 12, at 8.
227. See WHITE HOUSE REPORT, supra note 218, at 23, 29.
228. Solove & Hartzog, supra note 10, at 626.
229. Thierer, supra note 34, at 426.
230. Sept. 22, 2010 FTC Statement, supra note 9, at 5.
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they are safe.”231  This is especially true when businesses fail to ade-
quately protect consumer data because of minor oversights that can
cause private information to “fall into the wrong hands, resulting in
fraud and other harm, and consumers [losing] confidence in the mar-
ket place.”232  Data breaches are becoming more frequent.  In 2011, at
least 855 data breaches occurred worldwide, compromising over 174
million data records.233  97% of these breaches could have been
avoided though the use of simple or intermediate countermeasures.234
Many times, data breaches are the result of unsophisticated attacks to
a company’s data-security system, such as brute force attacks or a
third party simply stealing the login credentials of an authorized em-
ployee.235  The increased rate at which technology is evolving236 only
makes data privacy more of an alarming concern—one that should not
be subject to unreasonable data practices or security measures.
Businesses and consumers participate in what is essentially an infor-
mation marketplace.237  For one, Americans are now transferring in-
formation online through multiple mediums, ranging from desktop
computers to smartphones and other electronic devices.238  Even the
mobile phone has taken on sophisticated features whereby consumers
can offer businesses their location information for navigation pur-
poses, to obtain traffic updates, or to locate nearby stores.239  To use
these location-based services, consumers grant companies the right to
locate and track their mobile phones, essentially determining the con-
231. John Hielscher, Data Breaches Challenging Banks, HERALD TRIB. (Feb. 9, 2014, 5:11
PM), http://www.heraldtribune.com/article/20140209/ARTICLE/140209664?p=1&tc=pg&tc=ar
(quoting Don Martin, marketing director at Charlotte State Bank & Trust).
232. Sept. 22, 2010 FTC Statement, supra note 9, at 5.
233. VERIZON, supra note 6, at 2.
234. Id. at 3.
235. See, e.g., FTC v. Wyndham Worldwide Corp., 10 F.3d 602, 624 (D.N.J. 2014); Michael
Winter, Home Depot Hackers Used Vendor Log-On To Steal Data, E-mails, USA TODAY (Nov.
7, 2014, 8:57 AM), http://www.usatoday.com/story/money/business/2014/11/06/home-depot-hack-
ers-stolen-data/18613167/.  Home Depot’s recent attack was the result of the hackers “obtaining
an outside vendor’s system credentials. The hackers often use targeted phishing emails to trick
an employee into giving out credentials.  Once they’ve entered the system through a compro-
mised computer, the hackers install malware that gathers information from the computer and
sends it back electronically to the hacker.”  Winter, supra; see also PONEMON INST., 2013 COST
OF DATA BREACH STUDY: UNITED STATES 7 (2013), available at http://www.symantec.com/con-
tent/en/us/about/media/pdfs/b-cost-of-a-data-breach-us-report-2013.en-us.pdf (explaining that a
high volume of data breaches were caused by criminal attack or mere employee negligence in
2012).
236. Thierer, supra note 34, at 414.
237. See id.
238. Pamela M. Prah, Target’s Data Breach Highlights State Role in Privacy, USA TODAY
(Jan. 16, 2014, 10:42 AM), http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2014/01/16/target-data-
breach-states-privacy/4509749.
239. King, supra note 37, at 110.
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sumer’s physical location.240  Accompanying this transfer of informa-
tion is the inherent risk that the information will be exposed to or
intercepted by unauthorized third parties, putting a consumer’s safety
at risk.241
The volume of information transferred and received through the In-
ternet is exceptionally high.  In fact, in 2007 alone, consumers world-
wide transferred about 1.9 zettabytes of information online, which is
as if every person on earth had received about 174 newspapers every
day.242  The transmission of personal data is so voluminous that the
need for a framework for securing or policing such data is a problem
without a one-size-fits-all solution.243  However, consumer PII needs
protection, and the Commission has been the driving force in this
arena, “tak[ing] matters into its own hands by challenging inadequate
corporate data-security practices . . . under [its] [S]ection 5 [author-
ity].”244  Congress must endorse the Commission’s proactive efforts.
D. How Congress May Help the Commission Boost
Data-Security Morale
The Commission’s data-security regulation is effective and amena-
ble.  Indeed, the Commission has become the dominant regulatory
force in the realm of data security and privacy.245  Legislation should
endorse the Commission’s leadership, especially because Congress has
not so much as raised a brow concerning the scope of the FTC’s Sec-
tion 5 authority since its inception.246  Congress should amend Section
5 of the FTC Act’s prohibition of unfair and deceptive practices to
include any business or commercial practice that results in, or has the
potential to cause, consumer injury.  This modification will leave the
Commission’s framework and leadership as it has developed thus far
untouched.  This framework is most ideal for the current state of af-
fairs related to data security.
Congress should proclaim it indisputable that the FTC has authority
to regulate data-security matters, as the White House suggests.247  The
240. Id. at 122.
241. See id. at 113.
242. Thierer, supra note 34, at 428.
243. Cf. id. at 433 (“When it comes to . . . information control efforts, there are not many good
examples of fixes or silver-bullet solutions that have been effective, at least not for very long.”).
244. Bender, supra note 146, at 1674.
245. Solove & Hartzog, supra note 10, at 605.
246. See, e.g., Orkin Exterminating Co. v. FTC, 849 F.2d 1354, 1368 (11th Cir. 1988) (reason-
ing that Congress conferred broad authority to the Commission under Section 5).
247. WHITE HOUSE REPORT, supra note 218, at 36 (urging Congress to grant the FTC direct
enforcement authority).
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Commission has also advocated on its own behalf to have Congress
draft legislation.248  The Commission cautions, as have most scholars,
that this legislation must be technologically neutral and flexible.249
The best way to avoid overlegislating is to merely amend the FTC Act
to expand the reach of unfair and deceptive practices to be more in-
clusive.  This will ensure the neutrality and flexibility the data-security
field needs.
As the Commission suggests, the security measures implemented by
companies are dependent on the sensitivity of the data collected by
the company, the size and complexity of the company’s data collec-
tion, and the types of risks the company faces with such data.250  Op-
erating in an information marketplace, companies need the flexibility
to innovate, not rigid rules that keep them and the Commission stag-
nant.251  As one commentator suggests, “Today’s solutions cannot an-
ticipate all such future uses [of consumer information], and any
solution must adapt to the rapid pace of technological changes.”252
Providing an amendment to the FTC Act will allow for a malleable
and technologically evolving solution.  The data-security world needs
an enforcement agency that is in the business of data-breach preven-
tion, not data-breach reaction.253
Though the Commission continues to regulate data-security mat-
ters, opponents increasingly challenge the existence of its authority to
do so under Section 5, primarily because the FTC Act is void of any
language regarding data-security matters.254  Companies are starting
to litigate in order to fiercely contest the Commission’s power.255
Their argument is simple: the FTC Act does not expressly state that
the Commission has data-security authority, so the Commission can-
not regulate data-security matters.256  This argument makes Con-
gress’s silence on this issue increasingly problematic.  Not only is the
Commission urging Congress to act, but even Illinois Attorney Gen-
248. Mar. 29, 2012 FTC Statement, supra note 12, at 41; June 15, 2011 FTC Statement, supra
note 10, at 52; Sept. 22, 2010 FTC Statement, supra note 9, at 8.
249. Mar. 29, 2012 FTC Statement, supra note 12, at 44.
250. June 15, 2011 FTC Statement, supra note 10, at 50.
251. Fertik, supra note 212, at 12.
252. Id.
253. Shaw, supra note 1, at 519.
254. See supra notes 30–31, 146, and accompanying text.
255. See supra notes 94, 106, 110–112, and accompanying text.
256. See supra notes 94, 101, 110–112, and accompanying text.
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eral Lisa Madigan is “proposing that Congress give[ ] an existing fed-
eral agency the authority to investigate data breaches.”257
An amendment to the FTC Act would easily facilitate this request
and increase the Commission’s ability to better protect consumers
against data-security breaches because companies would undeniably
be accountable to the Commission for inadequate data-security
practices.
IV. IMPACT
A. The Effects of Endorsing the Commission’s
Working Framework
Section 5 of the FTC Act grants the Commission authority to define
and regulate deceptive or unfair activities in the context of business
practices.258  Judicious use of Section 5 has made the Commission the
country’s largest consumer protection agency.  With its Section 5 au-
thority, the Commission has focused on one underlying standard in
the context of data security: companies must develop reasonable data-
security methods.  The Commission’s guiding principles—privacy by
design, simplified consumer choice, and greater transparency—work
to further this standard, and proves flexible and accommodating to
businesses of all types and sizes.  A flexible framework provides sev-
eral positive effects for companies and consumers alike: (1) creative
security and business models; (2) lower security costs; and (3) in-
creased protection for consumers.
First, companies will likely experience an increased capacity to in-
novate, thereby increasing customer satisfaction and profits.  Thierer
said it best: “‘Silver bullet’ solutions won’t work.”259  There is no one-
size-fits-all data-security model that will work for all business types
and data-collection models.  Therefore, imposing a standard, which
can be interpreted to benefit a company’s individual needs, is the best
approach.  The development of creative solutions for data privacy will
help spark competition because consumers will engage in business
with companies which whom they feel safest.260  Therefore, companies
need the flexibility to generate creative solutions to fit their particular
data-collection scheme.  Companies, not government, are best suited
257. Sandra Guy, Consumer Complaints About Data Breaches Skyrocket in Illinois, CHI. SUN-
TIMES.COM (Mar. 12, 2014, 6:29 AM), http://www.suntimes.com/news/metro/25512687-418/con-
sumer-complaints-about-data-breaches-skyrocket-in-illinois.html.
258. See 15 U.S.C § 45(a) (2012).
259. Thierer, supra note 34, at 433.
260. WHITE HOUSE REPORT, supra note 218 (“Citizens who feel protected from misuse of
their personal information feel free to engage in commerce . . . .”).
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to determine what is more appropriate for their individual business
model.261
Second, improvements in data-security practices will also likely ben-
efit companies and financial institutions by helping them to cut costs
related to data breaches.  Data breaches often result in fraudulent
credit or debit card charges, leaving banks and credit unions to “eat
the loss,” or having companies suffer the loss, which can include drops
in share values.262  Financial institutions typically issue new cards to
curb the onset of fraudulent transactions.263  As a result of the Target
breach, in particular, financial institutions reissued about 17.2 million
debit and credit cards, costing about $172 million.264  Similarly, com-
panies sustain a comparable amount of financial loss due to data
breaches.  For example, the average organizational cost of major data
breaches in 2012 was around $5.4 million.265  These expenses include
hiring forensic experts, credit monitoring, and investigations.266  Ade-
quate data-security methods will help offset the losses incurred by
these financial institutions and decrease the threat of litigation by
these institutions against companies that collect consumer data and
suffer from data breaches.  The Commission has already provided the
blueprint for solving these issues—create reasonable data-security
measures using privacy by design, consumer choice, and greater
transparency.
Finally, consumers will receive stronger protection and increased
privacy with respect to their personal data if businesses are required
to prioritize and implement customized data-security measures in sell-
ing their products and services.  Consumers are fearful of the conse-
quences of data breaches.  One consumer affected by the 2013 Target
data breach commented that she became less confident about her fi-
261. For example, compare the data-security methods of Google and Microsoft Corp.
(Microsoft). When Google launched its Google+ program, it used privacy as a structural compo-
nent of the program’s design, whereby users could choose with whom they wanted to share their
information.  Kashmir Hill, Why “Privacy by Design” Is the New Corporate Hotness, FORBES
(July 28, 2011, 1:23 PM), http:www.forbes.com/sites/kashmirhill/2011/07/28/why-privacy-by-de-
sign-is-the-new-corporate-hotness (A Forbes Contributer blog).  Conversely, Microsoft explains
that its entire program is centered on the privacy by design concept, focusing on building privacy
protections from the ground up. Trustworthy Computing, MICROSOFT, http://
www.microsoft.com/en-us/twc/privacy/commitment.aspx (last visited Feb. 5, 2014).
262. Hielscher, supra note 231.  Target suffered breach-related costs of around $148 million.
Abrams, supra note 4, at B3.
263. Hielscher, supra note 231.
264. Id. These costs include producing new credit cards, informing consumers about the reis-
suance of the cards, activating the cards, and staffing call centers to handle consumer inquiries.
Id.
265. PONEMON INST., supra note 235, at 1.
266. Id. at 3.
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nancial safety while shopping at Target after the breach: “I was about
to take out my credit card, and then I thought[,] . . . I’m not comforta-
ble.”267  Consumer trust is in dire need of repair, and without it, com-
panies will continue to suffer negative results.268  The Commission’s
framework gives companies room to develop the best reasonable mea-
sures suited for their particular industry.
B. Why Congress’s Amendment Matters for Consumers
and Businesses Alike
Data-security breaches are effectively becoming commonplace in
the technology market.269  As a result, consumers are exposed to in-
creased financial and safety risks.270  A regulatory strategy must be
developed to strike a healthy balance between consumer-privacy in-
terests and companies’ interest to innovate and derive profit.  Data-
security enforcement standards cannot be so rigid as to stifle business
growth or give hackers time to exploit the rules.271  Similarly, legisla-
tion should not be so lax as to give companies a license to push con-
sumer privacy completely off their priority list.
The most effective balance is achieved through the Commission’s
framework and flexibility, which would be best provided through
Congress’s approval of a legislative amendment.  A legislative amend-
ment to the reach of unfair and deceptive practices provides three par-
ticular benefits: (1) it avoids any contradiction or conflict to existing
FTC authority under the FTC Act while granting the Commission ex-
plicit authority to regulate data-security measures; (2) it avoids under-
mining the Commission’s existing de facto data-security framework;
and (3) it avoids hampering the creativity of businesses to generate
sophisticated security models.
First, the FTC Act requires that the Commission regulate unfair
and deceptive practices.272  Under the Act, unfair and deceptive prac-
267. Beth Pinsker, Consumers Vent Frustration and Anger at Target Data Breach, REUTERS
(Jan. 13, 2014, 7:28 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/01/14/us-target-consumers-idUS
BREA0D01Z20140114.
268. See Abrams, supra note 4 (“It’s going to take them a long time to build the trust of the
shopper and get them to where they were prior to [its breach].” (quoting John Kindervag, vice
president and principal analyst with Forrester Research)).
269. Paul Ziobro, Target Data Breach Went on Longer than Thought, WALL ST. J. (Feb. 4,
2014, 1:29 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052702304851104579362671467541380.
270. See e.g., Kenneth R. Harney, Retailers’ Data Breaches May Damage Credit Scores of
Home Buyers, WASH. POST, Feb. 1, 2014, at EZ.3 (explaining that consumers whose credit card
information is stolen can suffer damaging effects to their credit scores and credit reports, even if
they are not liable for any fraudulent purchases).
271. Ziobro, supra note 269.
272. 15 U.S.C § 45(a).
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tices include acts that “cause or are likely to cause reasonable or fore-
seeable injury” or involve material conduct.273  To show an unfair
practice, the Commission must satisfy a three-part test.274  To show a
deceptive practice, the Commission must show that the practice likely
misled consumers.275  Expanding the reach of unfair and deceptive
practices to include “any business or commercial practice that results
in or potentially causes consumer injury” does not tamper with the
Commission’s legal burdens under either the unfair or deceptive
prongs.  The addition would operate to unequivocally grant the Com-
mission the authority to regulate data-security practices implemented
by companies collecting consumer PII.  This would eradicate the argu-
ment against the Commission’s lack of data-security authority while
making sure that the Commission is still bound by its statutory re-
quirements.  Therefore, courts can still apply the tests to show
whether the Commission has met the applicable respective test for
this broader scope of authority.
Second, an amendment to the FTC Act’s reach of unfair and decep-
tive practices will work in tandem with and improve the potency of the
Commission’s existing de facto data-security framework.  The Com-
mission requires that companies provide reasonable data-security
measures by employing privacy by design, consumer choice, and
greater transparency.276  Expanding the unfair and deceptive practices
reach will provide increased incentive for companies to adhere to the
Commission’s standard.  Similarly, it will reduce companies’ power to
push against the Commission’s authority to regulate data security, as
data-security practices would fall neatly into the “any business or
commercial practice” part of the amended Act.
Finally, businesses often differ in their approaches to collecting and
storing data, and the Commission should also differ in its approach to
adequately monitor and regulate these businesses.  Compare Google
Wallet, a mobile application consumers can use to store and send
money by sharing their own personal bank accounts,277 to Pandora, a
music streaming service that requires consumers to share their email
address, birth year, gender, and zip code.278  These applications use
different personal data for different purposes.  To be effective, the
Commission must monitor them both to ensure consumer protection.
273. Id. § 45(a)(4)(A).
274. See supra notes 73–74 and accompanying text.
275. See supra note 54 and accompanying text.
276. 2012 PRIVACY REPORT, supra note 12, at vii–viii.
277. Google Wallet, GOOGLE, http://www.google.com/wallet/send-money (last visited Feb. 4,
2014).
278. Privacy Policy, PANDORA, http://www.pandora.com/privacy (last visited Feb. 4, 2014).
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But there is no one-size-fits-all rule to place on each of these data-
collection practices, nor is there one design method that will abso-
lutely secure each data-collection practice.  Because the Commission
operates with a flexible standard, it can tailor its investigation and reg-
ulation strategies to fit the particular data practice under review.  This
means what the Commission and the respective company determines
is an adequate or reasonable data-security practice for Google Wallet
may differ entirely from that which is adequate for Pandora.  Differ-
ences in regulation are necessary to push companies to engage in their
best efforts in creating the ideal security programs to fit their com-
pany’s size and data-collection methods.
Surely, the Commission’s framework will not completely eradicate
all data-security breaches, but a flexible enforcement agency backed
by deferential data-security legislation will better equip the Commis-
sion to ensure that companies are doing their very best to guard
against commonplace data-security risks.  This type of strategy will
help the Commission become an agency that engages in the preven-
tion of data breaches, rather than one that merely reacts to a data
breach.
V. CONCLUSION
Professors Solove and Hartzog’s observation is a sound one: absent
the Commission’s already effective regulatory method, “the U.S. ap-
proach to privacy legislation would lose nearly all its legitimacy.”279
Consumers cannot afford to be left without protection at a time when
personal data is easily transferrable and disposed of in the technologi-
cal marketplace.  Data breaches strike a mighty blow to consumer mo-
rale.280  Breaches spark fear and distrust.281  More business
accountability is the answer.
The Commission has turned up the degree of Section 5 enforcement
to an uncomfortable temperature, and companies are beginning to
feel the heat.  Target-like catastrophes are unacceptable to businesses
and consumers alike.  The Commission has proactively assumed the
responsibility as the leading force behind consumer protection, and it
has done an effective job thus far.  If Congress plans to protect data
privacy and consumer PII, it should start by acknowledging the FTC’s
279. Solove & Hartzog, supra note 10, at 604.
280. Paul Ziobro & Danny Yadron, Target Says Millions More at Risk, WALL ST. J., Jan.
11–12, 2014, at B1 (positing that the data breaches experienced by Target and Neiman Marcus
will “likely . . . heighten shoppers’ concerns about the security of their personal and financial
data”).
281. Id.
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data-security authority and endorsing the framework the FTC has al-
ready set in motion through a legislative amendment.  Simply put, the
Commission knows how to best address data-privacy concerns, and
Congress should affirmatively acknowledge this fact to the rest of the
data-privacy world.
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